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Chapter VII 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND 
APPRAISAL: POLICY AND LAW 
T he Tanker War is important for many reasons. For the belligerents, Iran and Iraq, it represented the maritime aspects of total war. For neutral Persian 
Gulf States the war was a major if not a dominant factor. Other neutral countries, 
e.g., the United States, at first treated the conflict as a policy matter, e.g., by pro-
claiming the need to maintain freedom of the seas and free access through the 
Strait ofHormuz, although they may have had naval or other forces in the area on 
routine or special operations. By the war's end in 1988, however, many countries, 
including the United States, were involved in the conflict in direct military action, 
e.g., convoying, accompanying or escorting neutral merchantmen, or indirectly 
through mine clearance and similar operations, as well as continuing statements of 
policies of freedom of the seas and the right of straits passage. States aligned with 
the belligerents, e.g., some Gulf countries, Arab League members, and other na-
tions, e.g., much of Western Europe, the USSR and the United States, dependent 
on Gulf oil or concerned with law of the sea, self-defense and law of armed conflict 
issues, became increasingly involved politically and economically. In some in-
stances involvement came through individual States' actions, and in other cases 
through collective statements or actions through intergovernmental organiza-
tions, e.g., the Arab League, the European Economic Community, the formerly 
moribund Western European Union, or the Group of Seven. Gulf States formed 
the Gulf Cooperation Council initially for internal security; the GCC assumed an 
economic and national security posture as the war continued. The Cold War-
gridlocked UN Security Council also became increasingly involved as the Tanker 
War continued, passing resolutions condemning belligerents' deprivations of 
high seas freedoms, violations of the LOAC, and continuation of the war in gen-
eral. The war ended with Iran's accepting Council Resolution 598, establishment 
ofUNIIMOG to supervise a ceasefire, and neutrals' individual and collective ef-
forts to clear the Gulf of mines. 
Although some commentators date the Tanker War from 1982 or perhaps 1984 
when belligerents' interceptions of and attacks on merchant ships accelerated, the 
war at sea actually began with the initial land battles in 1980 near the Shatt aI-Arab 
when 70+ merchantmen were bottled up in the Shatto The belligerents' exclusion 
zone proclamations and attempts to route neutral traffic came soon thereafter. By 
1988 seafaring countries had suffered major tonnage losses in their merchant 
fleets, particularly tankers, but a worldwide glut of available bulk petroleum 
606 The Tanker War 
" 
carriers pardy offset these losses. The number of ships lost, or declared construc-
tive total losses, was relatively low because of merchant ships' growth in size since 
World War II. Nevertheless, more merchant mariners lost their lives during 
1980-88 than at any time since that War; again, the number was low because of 
smaller-sized merchant crews on most ships. Iraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facili-
ties produced a major oil spill in the Gulf; spills probably also resulted from 
belligerents' attacks on other enemy facilities and neutral countries' shoreside pe-
troleum production or pumping facilities. Undoubtedly oil slicks resulted from 
belligerents' attacks on merchantmen or after neutral navies responded in self-de-
fense to belligerents' maritime attacks. 
Chapter II discusses these developments in more detail. And while Chapter III 
analyzes the Tanker War in the context of self-defense and other aspects of the jus 
ad bellum under the UN Charter, and Chapters IV (LOS issues), V (LOAC issues) 
and VI (law of the maritime environment) analyze LOS andjus in bello (i.e., LOAC) 
problems during the war, a summary of important legal aspects of the Tanker War 
and projections for the future are useful here. 
Part A. Self-Defense, Charter Law and Neutrality Issues! 
After the Nicaragua Case and its applying customary law alongside the Charter, 
which is a treaty (albeit the most important of the post-World War II agreements 
because of its Article 103 trumping provision for other treaties and the possibility 
that parts of it may now havejus cogens2 status), a principal issue arising from the 
war is the definition and scope of the right of self-defense. First, it is arguable, fol-
lowing the Case, that a parallel customary law of self-defense travels alongside 
Charter-based principles deriving from Article 51. Second, this customary right of 
self-defense may be different in content and scope from Charter-based norms and 
therefore subject to the balancing of sources oflaw usually employed in determin-
ing norms to be applied in a situation.3 Third, if the right of self-defense is ajus 
cogens norm, as some claim, it has priority over all other rules (custom, treaties, 
general principles, etc.) except other jus cogens norms, e.g., the law under the Char-
ter, Article 2(4). (If self-defense is ajus cogens norm, it must be balanced with other 
jus cogens norms, e.g., those under Article 2(4).) 
The Tanker War did not resolve these issues. Indeed, belligerents' claims and 
counterclaims of aggression at the beginning of the war left neutrals in a legal 
quandary, if one subscribes to a view, characterized as nonbelligerency during 
1939-41 when the United States was officially neutral, that under the Charter 
States may aid victims of aggression. Unlike the 1990-91 Coalition buildup against 
Iraq where Iraqi aggression was blatant, the 1980-88 war's record is far from clear. 
However, practice since 1945 seems to poin tto a right of countries to aid victims of 
aggression, the position of the International Law Association's Budapest Articles 
interpretation of the Pact of Paris (1928), still in force for the United States and 
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many countries when treaty succession principles are considered. The Pact con-
demns the use of war as an instrument of national policy, subject to the inherent 
right of self-defense.4 The Falklands/Malvinas War is an example of aggression 
and neutrals' response to aid a target of aggression, the United Kingdom. 
The Tanker War supplies several examples of informal collective self-defense, 
which continues to exist during the Charter era as a valid response, provided ade-
quate notice of actions is given. Unlike the 1990-91 conflict, where the United 
States had self-defense agreements with Kuwait and perhaps other Gulf countries 
and the possibility of multilateral NATO involvement ifIraq had moved against 
Turkey to the north, there was no formal treaty arrangement proclaiming a right of 
collective self-defense like the soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact, the NATO treaties, 
or bilateral agreements the United States and many nations have negotiated since 
World War II. To be sure, the GCC pledged collective action in many respects, but 
it does not have a formal statement of collective self-defense. Nevertheless, it may 
be argued that the GeC engaged in informal collective self-defense actions among 
its members during the Tanker War. 
Neutrals' cooperating to clear the Gulf of mines, and the Red Sea in the case of 
the 1984 Libyan mining, are other examples ofinformal collective self-defense. In-
sofar as the record indicates, there were no formal treaties proclaiming self-defense 
arrangements among Gulf and other States for this and similar purposes. N ever-
theless, when these countries worked together to clear the seas of mines, they were 
in effect acting collectively to defend coastal States' shores, and countries' mer-
chant shipping plying these waters, from the potential for mine attack. 
The same might be said for cooperation to protect neutral shipping from 
belligerents' air and warship attacks. The US declaration that it would extend pro-
tection to foreign-flag neutral merchant ships not carrying goods destined for a 
belligerent, upon that neutral's request, was a third example of informal collective 
self-defense. The United States had a right to defend US-flag merchant ships un-
der longstanding rules of international law; this included its right to defend Ku-
waiti tankers reflagged under US law and the LOS. However, in those situations 
only US flagged vessels were involved; issues of collective self-defense, formal 
through treaty or informal through other arrangements, did not arise. When the 
United States published its policy of defending foreign-flag ships upon request, it 
legitimately acted under a right of informal self-defense as long as the policy was 
published, was clear, and did not otherwise violate Charter principles, e.g., aiding 
an aggressor. 
Belligerents' attacks on neutral territories, including oil production or pump-
ing facilities, were violations of Article 2(4), and could have triggered a right ofin-
dividual or collective self-defense. The same could be said about belligerents' 
attacks on neutral flag shipping where there were no LOAC violations (e.g., fleeing 
legitimate belligerent attempts to exercise visit and search). 
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The United States claimed rights of self-defense in its responses to attacks on its 
warships and US-flag merchant ships. In most cases these responses were reactive 
in nature, i.e., coming after a belligerent's attack. In some cases a response came 
while a belligerent was attacking or threatening attack; this invoked anticipatory 
self-defense issues. Commentators agree that self-defense responses, whether reac-
tive or anticipatory, must be necessary and proportional under the circumstances. 
Commentators disagree on whether a right of anticipatory self-defense, which ap-
pends a requirement of no other alternative besides the response, exists in the 
Charter era. Given the nature of modern weaponry and its delivery systems, it 
would seem that a right of anticipatory self-defense, whether delivered individu-
ally by a State or collectively by countries acting in formal concert (i.e., pursuant to 
treaty) or informally, is admissible during the Charter era. To repeat: This right of 
anticipatory self-defense is subject to limitations, e.g., necessity, proportionality, 
admitting of no other alternative, and prior consultation (perhaps agreed in ad-
vance) for collective response. Responding States are bound by what their leader-
ship knows, or would be reasonably expected to know, at the time of decision.s 
Necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense responses may be, but are 
not necessarily, the same as those to be observed during LOAC situations. For ex-
ample, during war belligerents may attack any legitimate military target (e.g., an 
enemy warship far from a war operations area), while self-defense proportionality 
may dictate a different rule (e.g., a warship far from an area of attack invoking a 
self-defense response mayor may not be a proper target under self-defense propor-
tionality principles). Although under the majority view the right of reprisal 
through use of force in peacetime is no longer an option in the Charter era, coun-
tries may respond through nonforce reprisals (proportional acts that are unlawful, 
e.g., trade sanctions in violation of trade treaties, seeking to compel an offender to 
observe the law) or retorsions (unfriendly acts, e.g., naval forces operating on the 
high seas offa State's coasts). There is nothing in the US actions during the Tanker 
War to indicate that it violated principles of necessity and proportionality, or that 
there were viable alternative actions the United States could have taken in antici-
patory self-defense situations, during the Tanker War, based on what the United 
States or its military commanders knew at the time of response. This is why, e.g., 
the Airbus response was legitimate; based on what the Vincennes commanding offi-
cer knew atthe time, he thought an attack was coming from an Iranian fighter. The 
response was necessary, proportional and admitting of no other alternative, 
thereby meeting the Caroline Case criteria, from what the commander then knew. 
It was a tragic mistake for which the United States paid compensation while not 
admitting liability. 
In terms of UN Security Council lawmaking, i.e., Council decisions binding as 
law on UN Members through Charter Articles 25 and 48, there were none that af-
fected the war at sea. However, the Council's increasing interest in and resolutions 
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on the war was apparent. The Council passed Resolutions 540 and 552, confirming 
as a matter of supportive "soft law," rights of freedom of navigation and access to 
neutral ports. Resolution 598 (1987), the basis for the 1988 ceasefire, was the first 
Council resolution specifically referring to a breach of the peace and Articles 39-40 
of Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The Tanker War also illustrates the relationship between rules of engagement 
and the law of self-defense. US ROE, then and now, instruct commanders that re-
gardless of options listed in the rules, the first duty is defense of the command or 
unit. This is coincident with the law of self-defense in the Charter era. ROE may 
give options that may be more restrictive than what international law might per-
mit in a given situation. 
Part B. The Law of the Sea and the Tanker War 
The Tanker War illustrated two fundamental principles applicable to armed 
conflict and the LOS: (1) the primacy of self-defense over norms in the LOS con-
ventions;6 (2) the LOS, whether stated in treaties or customary law, is subject to 
other rules of international law, i.e., the LOAC, in situations involving armed con-
flict at sea? 
As to specific LOS issues, Security Council Resolutions 540 and 552 and neu-
trals' protests and actions confirmed customary high seas freedoms and entry into 
neutral ports. The right of neutrals, including neutral warships, to unimpeded 
straits passage, i.e., through the Strait ofHormuz, was also confirmed. 
The straits passage controversy is but one more argument for ratifying the 1982 
LOS Convention by major maritime powers, e.g., the United States. Others on the 
periphery of the war include strengthening customary warship immunity rules, 
for which there is a gap in the 1958 LOS conventions; standards for warship inno-
cent passage in the territorial sea; maritime environmental standards; and rules 
delimiting ocean areas like the EEZ, continental shelf, contiguous zone and terri-
torial sea.8 
Although more of an issue of admiralty and maritime law and only indirectly an 
LOS issue, the war demonstrated the relationship of national decisionmaking, and 
perhaps decisions at international levels, with private interests, e.g., seafarers and 
their unions and the complicated web of parties (vessel owners, charterers, 
sub charterers, cargo interests, marine insurance) engaged in ocean trade, whether 
in war or peace. Arms suppliers might operate contrary to national policies, or per-
haps with overt or covert governmental assistance. 
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Part C. The Tanker War and the Law of Armed Conflict 
The Tanker War raised many issues relevant to modem warfare at sea. While 
Parts V.A-V.I analyze these in more detail, this Part offers summaries ofimportant 
points. 
1. Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality; ROE; 
the Spatial Dimension. 9 
The general factual record is not clear as to whether the belligerents generally 
observed LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction in attacks 
during the Tanker War, based on information they had or should have had when 
deciding on attacks. However, it is reasonably certain that these principles were 
not observed in specific situations, e.g., mine warfare, discussed below and in Parts 
V.B-V.I. 
The war is an example of the difference between necessity, proportionality, etc., 
principles that must be observed under the LOAC and principles employing the 
same names, e.g., necessity and proportionality, that must be observed in self-de-
fense responses. What is necessary and proportional in a self-defense response, and 
what is necessary and proportional under the LOAC, may be entirely different. 
The United States observed these principles in its self-defense responses where its 
warships and military aircraft were under attack, or were reasonably believed to be 
under attack, and in its responses to attacks on merchant shipping. Whether these 
responses would have met LOAC standards, or whether a different and greater or 
lesser response would have been in order if the United States had been at war with 
Iran or Iraq, would have required different analysis. For example, the United 
States responded proportionally in self-defense in shooting to destroy Iranian na-
val vessels and platforms attacking it. The United States would not have been re-
quired to wait for an Iranian attack, or threat of attack under anticipatory 
self-defense principles, if the United States had been at war with that country. 
The war also demonstrates differences in ocean spatial dimensions under the 
LOAC and the LOS. The LOAC recognizes only two divisions of ocean areas: the 
high seas and territorial waters, today equated to the territorial sea. The LOAC 
also differentiates between belligerents' territorial seas and territorial seas ofneu-
trals, while the LOS has no similar differentiation. A belligerent may wage war, 
subject to other LOAC principles (e.g., rights of neutrals, principles of humanity, 
etc.) on the high seas, in its territorial waters, in its allies' territorial waters and in 
enemy territorial waters. It may not wage war in neutral territorial waters. To do so 
violates the LOAC. It is also a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, if directed 
against the neutral coastal State, and would therefore be subjectto that State's right 
to exercise individual and collective self-defense. It would also be a violation of 
LOS innocent passage rules. Thus belligerents' attacks on neutrals' coastal 
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installations during the Tanker War was an LOAC violation, an LOS violation to 
the extent that belligerents did not exercise innocent passage rules or overflew 
neutral territorial waters without coastal State permission, and a violation of the 
Charter. 
The LOAC and Charter law are not the same in this context, either. For exam-
ple, a belligerent may attack an enemy ship, e.g., a submarine, lurking in neutral 
territorial seas where that neutral either cannot or will not cause the submarine to 
leave under the LOAC, under principles of necessity. A neutral could not attack 
that submarine unless threatened by it under principles of self-defense, and the 
standards for either attack might be the same or different. No such incidents oc-
curred during the Tanker War, however, but this again illustrates the point of the 
difference between self-defense principles and LOAC principles. Nor are the LOS 
and the LOAC necessarily the same under the circumstances. For example, neu-
tral warships are subject to the LOS innocent passage regime for territorial sea pas: 
sage, while belligerents' warships are subject, under special LOAC rules applicable 
to them through the LOS other rules principle, to the LOAC during war. If a bel-
ligerent's warship within neutral territorial waters and subject to the LOAC for 
such passage threatens or attacks a coastal State, that coastal State has inherent 
rights of individual or collective self-defense besides rights it might have under 
the LOAC governing belligerent warship passage. Conversely, the warship retains 
its rights of individual and collective self-defense. The same is true for neutral 
warships legitimately exercising LOS rights of innocent passage. If a warship 
transiting under innocent passage rules attacks or threatens a coastal State, that 
State may respond in self-defense in addition to whatever claims it might have un-
der the LOS. Conversely, the warship retains its rights ofindividual and collective 
self-defense. 
As noted above, LOS divisions of the sea (e.g., high seas fishing areas, EEZs, 
continental shelf waters, contiguous zones, or the Area) are high seas areas for 
LOAC purposes. Robertson advanced a view, which the San Remo Manual accepts, 
that belligerents must observe due regard for neutrals' rights in these areas, includ-
ing neutrals' high seas rights of,e.g., freedom of navigation and overflight, pipeline 
and cable laying, etc., so long as there is no positive LOAC rule governing a situa-
tion. LOS high seas freedoms definitions of ocean areas, e.g., of the EEZ, may be 
used in LOAC situations as rules for belligerent operations, but the two need not 
coincide. Where they do, there may be confusion as the sometimes muddled 
claims of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War demonstrate. Thus it was proper for 
Iran and Iraq to declare maritime exclusion zones, analyzed under the name of war 
zones in this volume, whose boundaries sometimes coincided with LOS lines, as in 
the case of Iranian territorial sea claims, and sometimes stretched over the high 
seas far beyond belligerents' EEZ claims. Whether use of these zones was lawful 
during the war is a different story, however.10 
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The war also raised issues of neutrals' straits passage rights during war. As Part 
IV.B.6 demonstrates, the LOS recognizes many varieties of international straits, 
depending on special treaty regimes in a few cases and geographic or LOS consid-
erations, e.g., whether a strait connects two high seas areas or otherwise, in other 
situations. The Strait ofHormuz, one of the Earth's great sea transportation arter-
ies, or choke points in geopolitical terms, may have been a high seas passage strait 
when the war began in 1980 and a three-mile territorial sea limit, although waning 
as a customary norm, was in force for many countries including the United States. 
As such, Iran had no right to close the strait, any more than it had a right to close 
high seas areas for other than limited times incident to belligerent naval opera-
tions.ll By the war's end, however, it was reasonably clear that coastal States could 
validly claim 12-mile territorial seas, the result being that except for perhaps a nar-
row sliver of high seas, unusable for navigation of all shipping but dhows, the Strait 
was governed by the 1982 LOS Convention transit passage regime as a matter of 
customary law. States' continued protests over perceived Iranian threats to close 
the Strait, and the majority view of commentators since 1980, combine to declare 
that no belligerent may close international straits like Hormuz to neutral 
shipping. 
2. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion. 12 
Iran conducted visit and search operations involving neutral merchant ships it 
suspected of carrying goods to Iraq to sustain its war-fighting or war-sustaining ef-
fort. Iran was within its rights to conduct these operations, but attacking neutral 
merchantmen incident to otherwise lawful visit and search was inadmissible un-
less the merchant ships were attempting to evade visit and search. Iran could em-
ploy military aircraft for these operations, but these aircraft could not attack 
neutral merchantmen involved in visit and search operations unless these vessels 
were attempting to escape. Both belligerents legitimately flew aircraft over the 
Gulf for general surveillance as a high seas freedom, but these aircraft could not in-
discriminatelyattack neutral merchantmen. The Tanker War strengthened the 
principle that belligerents may use military aircraft, including helicopters, in ad-
dition to warships for visit and search operations. 
The United States and other neutrals were within their rights to convoy, es-
cort or accompany neutral merchant ships that did not carry goods sustaining 
belligerents' war efforts. A neutral could convoy, escort or accompany a merchant-
man flying that neutral's flag, and that neutral could convoy, escort or accompany 
merchant vessels with other neutrals' registry if the two States agreed on this pro-
cedure. Belligerents' attacks on these formations could be met by self-defense re-
sponses. Neutrals could clear mines belligerents laid indiscriminately on the high 
seas, particularly those laid in shipping lanes, also under self-defense principles. 
Conclusions and Appraisal 613 
3. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys. 13 
Apparently the belligerents did not attack platforms the LOAC exempts as tar-
gets unless they contribute to the enemy war effort, e.g., hospital ships or civil air-
liners. On the other hand, Iran and Iraq did not always discriminate between 
merchant ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo for the enemy under 
enemy flags and innocent merchantmen with other cargoes. While it was lawful 
for Iraq to attack merchantmen, regardless of flag, under Iranian military convoy, 
it was not lawful for Iran or Iraq to attack independently-steaming merchantmen 
bound for neutral ports and not carrying goods for the enemy war effort. It was also 
not lawful for Iran to attack neutral flag merchant ships accompanied, escorted or 
convoyed by neutral warships. 
As noted in Part C.l, it is also questionable whether Iranian and Iraqi attacks 
were necessary and proportional when visit, search and diversion were options, 
and whether under the circumstances belligerents observed humanitarian law 
standards in caring for merchant ship survivors after attacks, particularly in the 
case ofIranian surface ship actions. 
Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' attacks on 
merchant ships flying their flag, and to attacks on other neutrals' merchant ships if 
the flag State requested protection. Although these responses were governed by 
the law of self-defense and not the LOAC, LOAC and LOS principles for succor-
ing survivors applied in these situations, even though necessity and proportional-
ity principles might have been different from LOAC standards for responses to 
these attacks. The same principles applied to what were perceived to be bel-
ligerents' attacks, or threats of attack, on neutral warships. There is no evidence 
that neutrals' responses were other than necessary and proportional, or admitting 
of no other alternative in the case of anticipatory self-defense, or that neutrals did 
not apply humanitarian standards after responding. 
4. Neutral Flag Merchantmen: Enemy Character; Rejlagging; Contraband. 14 
Neutral flag merchantmen that Iran convoyed down its coasts acquired enemy 
character by being convoyed. War-fighting or war-sustaining goods aboard neu-
tral flag merchant ships preceding to or from belligerents' ports and under bellig-
erent direction or control would also have resulted in characterization as flying an 
enemy flag and therefore being subject to belligerents' attack and destruction be-
sides liability to visit, search, diversion and condemnation as prize. On the other 
hand, goods destined to or from neutral ports, invoiced under other than a bellig-
erent's title, did not give a neutral flag merchant ship enemy character. These ves-
sels were not subject to attack on this account. 
During the war neutral States' merchantmen were reflagged under US or other 
registry. Besides qualifying as neutral flag merchant ships under the LOS, under 
the LOAC these vessels were considered as flying a neutral flag. Unless, e.g., they 
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carried war-fighting or war-sustaining goods destined to or from a belligerent port 
while under belligerent direction or attempted to evade legitimate visit and search, 
they were not subject to attack on this account. 
The law of contraband did not impact the war; it could have applied only to in-
bound cargoes destined for a belligerent. Therefore, this law did not apply to out-
bound shipments, nor did it apply to pipeline shipments to neutrals, even though 
there may have been later transshipment to neutral flag ships for sealift. The law of 
contraband could not have applied until 1988, when Iran published a list; contra-
band lists must be published before the law of contraband may be applied. That list 
comported generally with modem principles, allowing diversion and prize court 
condemnation of ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined 
to or from an enemy, instead of high seas seizure and later condemnation before a 
prize court, or current concepts of contraband, which tend to ignore publication of 
lists of absolute or conditional contraband and which only list goods not consid-
ered contraband, i.e., free goods, or humanitarian cargoes. Although systems like 
navicerts or clearcerts have been used during the Charter era, e.g., during the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis, thereis no evidence of employment of this option during the 
war. 
s. The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War. 15 
There is no formal record of either belligerent's declaring a blockade, although 
commentators loosely mentioned blockade in their accounts, as similar sources 
would during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Even if these commentators reflected govern-
ment sources, neither belligerent observed well-established rules for blockades, 
which must be noticed, be definite in area, and state a time when a blockade begins 
an~ grace period for neutral ships to leave a blockaded area. It is doubtful whether 
Iraq could have maintained an effective blockade, since it had no appreciable naval 
assets to conduct one; paper blockades have been unlawful since the 1856 Paris 
Declaration. Although Iraq might have declared a blockade to be enforced by air-
craft, provided those aircraft could have functioned as surface ships do in block-
ade, e.g., communicating with merchant ships, diverting them as appropriate, or 
boarding them for visit and search, Iraq did not declare such a blockade. Iran's at-
tempts to inhibit Kuwait or Saudi Arabia-bound merchant traffic by mining, war-
ships or aircraft attacks could not have been characterized as a blockade; the 
LOAC does not permit blockades of neutral coasts. Thus the UN Security Council 
was fully justified in condemning this action in Resolution 552, in addition to the 
Resolution's explicit invocation of LOS principles of freedom of the seas and free-
dom to enter neutral ports. 
Iraq refused to allow passage of trapped merchant ships out of the Shatt aI-Arab 
at the beginning of the war. Ifit had done so, this would have been permissible as a 
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matter ofinternationallaw by analogy to cartel ships passing through blockade, if a 
legitimate blockade of nearby high seas areas had been declared. 
6. Zones: Excluding Shipping,AircraftfromArea of Belligerents' Naval Operations; 
High Seas Defense Zones; War Zones; Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean 
Zones Created for Humanitarian Law Purposes. 16 
Although customary law, recently confirmed in publications like theSanRemo 
Manual and NWP I-14M, allows belligerents to exclude neutral shipping and air-
craft from an immediate area of belligerent naval operations, there is no record of 
this during the Tanker War. 
The United States published warnings of risk of self-defense responses if ship-
ping or aircraft came within stated ranges of US forces operating in international 
waters. Although proclaiming these self-defense zones (SDZs) was admissible, 
there is no obligation to publish them. They are like warnings, usually published 
in NOT AMs and NOTMARs, that States may legitimately publish for peacetime 
naval maneuvers, which Iran published during the Tanker War for this purpose. 
States may use the seas beyond territorial waters for naval maneuvers if they have 
due regard for others' high seas/EEZ uses, i.e., freedoms of navigation and over-
flight. States conducting peacetime high seas naval maneuvers may not exclude 
other shipping and aircraft from the areas of these maneuvers as they can for bellig-
erent naval operations during war. If there is a belligerent naval operation during 
war that includes what would usually be considered peacetime naval operations, 
e.g., high seas refueling in the course of war measures against an enemy, the right of 
exclusion applies to the ocean area(s) affected insofar as the areas and times for the 
operations coincide. States also have a right of self-defense at sea, for which an SDZ 
warning is notice. Exercise of self-defense does not require an SDZ notice as a pre-
requisite. A State's ROE or other national rules, perhaps stated in operation orders 
or plans, may require it, but this would be a national policy or national law require-
ment and not a rule of international law. 
The belligerents published war zone notices. Although these zones were not 
"paper" zones, were reasonable in geographic scope and gave notice of times of ap-
plication, they could not be used to justify free-fire on all shipping in these areas. If 
not a paper zone, (i.e., a zone that a State proclaims when that State has insufficient 
military assets to enforce the zone) and if noticed with stated times of application 
and if reasonable in geographic scope under the circumstances, a war zone may be 
proclaimed under the LOAC. LOAC principles, e.g., rules for visit and search, ap-
ply within the zone. States proclaiming a zone must have due regard for neutrals' 
LOS rights, e.g., of freedom of navigation and overflight, and must have due regard 
for the maritime environment, within the zone. Neutrals' rights to respond in in-
dividual and collective self-defense also apply within a zone. Belligerents also have 
self-defense rights against neutral States within a zone. 
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Saudi Arabia proclaimed an ADIZ over the Gulf during the war; it was within 
its rights under international law to do so. Actions against intruding aircraft were 
governed by the law of self-defense, i.e., responses had to be necessary and propor-
tional, and in the case of anticipatory self-defense, admitting of no other alterna-
tive, under the circumstances of each situation, based on what the responsible 
commander, which might have been a single aviator in the case of solo flights to in-
vestigate an intruder, knew or should have known at the time. 
7. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Waifare. 17 
There were two principal issues connected with weapons and weapons use dur-
ing the Tanker War; shore bombardment from the sea and mine warfare at sea. Al-
though Iraq used poison gas against its opponent in the land war during 1980-88, 
there is no record of its use in the sea war. Intermediate range ballistic missiles 
were employed during the War of the Cities, but these were land-launched and hit 
land-based targets, an issue outside the scope of this volume. 
There were attacks delivered from over the sea against land-oriented targets, 
e.g., belligerents' strikes against oil platforms in enemy territorial seas and other 
offshore zones and shore facilities. Shore-based aircraft, perhaps flying over the 
Gulf; and perhaps belligerents' naval assets, delivered these attacks. The record is 
not clear as to the lawfulness of these operations in terms of compliance with rules 
for naval bombardment from the sea or air. Whether notice if appropriate was 
given; whether Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards, articulating general ne-
cessity and proportionality standards; whether civilian objects or historical, artis-
tic, scientific or hospital sites were involved; whether belligerents attacked areas 
where the civil population was concentrated; whether attacks were designed to 
and did terrorize the civil population; or whether attacks followed general LOAC 
principles of necessity and proportionality; is not clear from the available evi-
dence. If the nature of attacks on Gulf shipping or the War of the Cities and other 
land-based aspects of the war are indicators, there is a high likelihood that some or 
all of these principles were at issue, and that there were LOAC violations. It is quite 
likely, e.g., that general principles of necessity and proportionality were violated, 
an example being the result of attacks on Iran's Nowruz facility in 1983, resulting 
in a large oil spill into the Gulf. We do not know with certainty, from the available 
record, whether and when LOAC violations occurred. These principles for shore 
bombardment, whether from aircraft or warships, applied to the Tanker War, 
however. Possible charges of LOAC violations are not proven in most cases. 
The record of mine warfare during the war is better documented. In unleashing 
what was in some cases unrestricted mine warfare, e.g., employing mines that did 
not deactivate after becoming unmoored or laying mines in neutral shipping lanes 
and perhaps neutrals' territorial waters, the belligerents violated general LOAC 
principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Failure to publish 
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minefield locations or to give alternative routes around a minefield were also 
LOAC violations, as was Iran's laying mines off neutral coasts solely to intercept 
shipping. Iran's mining the Strait ofHormuz in an attempt to deny international 
straits passage to neutral vessels also violated the LOAC.18 
During the war neutral navies engaged in mine countermeasures. International 
law permitted sweeping of unlawfully laid mines in international waters, and in 
neutrals' territorial seas with approval of the neutral coastal State. The law of 
self-defense also authorized these actions.19 
8. Other Humanitarian Law Issues. 20 
Parts V.A-V.G and VILC.l-VILC.7 have analyzed LOAC questions that arose, 
or may have arisen, during the Tanker War. There were also humanitarian law is-
sues related to merchant ship crews trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab in 1980, rescuing 
those in peril on the sea, and neutral repatriations of belligerent armed forces 
members. 
If crew stranded in the Shatt aI-Arab were aboard vessels that had not acquired 
enemy character, they were protected persons under the Fourth Convention and 
were entitled to be returned home promptly. If aboard vessels that had acquired 
enemy character, they had prisoner of war status. However, these PW mariners 
were entitled to repatriation at cessation of hostilities in 1988, and not 10 years 
later, when many PW's were repatriated. If seriously ill or wounded, they should 
have been repatriated long before 1998. Ifinternees under the Fourth Convention, 
they should have been returned at the end of hostilities. 
US forces rescued surviving crew of the minelayer IranAjr after the US self-de-
fense response. These crew members and remains of dead crew were turned over to 
Omani Red Crescent officials, who repatriated them to Iran. The United States 
also picked up Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members after they went 
overboard during another US self-defense response. Two died aboard US Navy 
ships; the remains and the survivors were turned over to Omani Red Crescent offi-
cials, who sent them to Iran. After the US self-defense response against the Rostum 
oil platforms, Iranian tugs were allowed to pick up survivors. As a technical matter, 
the law of self-defense covered these situations, but the United States acted prop-
erly, following LOAC principles in rescuing survivors, or allowing them to be res-
cued. To the extent that other mariners were in peril after other self-defense 
responses, e.g., the US response to Iranian warship attacks, the same principles 
applied. 
These situations might be contrasted with a US rescue of an Iraqi pilot whose 
plane was shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the basic rule of assisting 
those in peril on the sea, common to the LOS and the LOAC, applied. (The United 
States turned the pilot over to Saudi Arabian Red Crescent officials, who repatri-
ated him to Iraq.) The same principles applied in other rescues of merchant 
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mariners in peril after belligerents' attacks on merchant ships; there is no positive 
record of this, but LOS and LOAC principles applied to these situations as well. 
Although under humanitarian law the neutral Red Crescent officials of Oman 
and Saudi Arabia should have detained the Iranian crews and the Iraqi pilot until 
the end of hostilities, the opposing belligerents did not protest any of these actions. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the opposing belligerent acquiesced in their pre-
mature repatriation. 
9. Deception During Anned Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy. 21 
There are no reported ruses of war, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents 
during the war. There are no reports of perfidious conduct. Other neutrals' actions 
may have been deceptive in nature, but they could not be considered ruses, since 
neutrals employed them. These included warships' painting pendent numbers 
black instead of white on black in the case of US warships to minimize reflective 
surfaces attractive to missiles. As long as a warship displays its pendent number, 
the LOAC is indifferent to its coloration. The same is true of nonreflective paint 
for general hull coating or hull configuration to make the vessel relatively invisible 
to missile radar, or emission control to minimize electronic radiations that might 
attract missiles or invite attack. 
Although there were situations where ships might have flown flags other than 
those of their registry States (the proposal to use the UN or ICRC ensign to extract 
merchantmen trapped in the Shattearlyin the war, and theproposallatein the war 
for a UN flotilla), these possibilities did not come to fruition. False flags issues 
therefore did not arise. 
No perfidy issues arose when merchantmen began tailing neutral naval convoys 
or simulating convoys during the night. This might have put the neutrals at 
greater risk. However, since they were neutral flagged, and perfidy applies to 
belligerents' conduct, no perfidy issue arose. Similarly, neutral merchant vessels 
that were painted grey like warships did not raise a problem of perfidy. 
Part D. The Tanker War and the Law of the Maritime Environment22 
The Tanker War's impact on the Gulf maritime environment is less than clear. 
The only recorded major environmental disaster occurred when Iraq attacked 
Iran's Nowruz offshore oil installations in 1983. Even ifit could be argued that the 
Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol did not apply between the parties be-
cause of law of treaties principles like suspension or termination during war, the 
law of treaties says thatthe Convention and Protocol continued to govern relations 
between belligerents and neutrals unless suspended or ended under theories ofim-
possibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances.23 HQwever, 
there were necessarily petroleum spills from vessels' bunkers or tankers split open 
or sunk by belligerents' attacks or during neutrals' self-defense responses. Thus, 
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although Chapter VI is largely theoretical when applied to the Tanker War, as me-
dia coverage ofIraq's outrageous and unlawful behavior during the 1990-91 Gulf 
War demonstrated, environmental issues are likely to arise and become major con-
siderations in future conflicts. 
The law of the environment as expressed in regional agreements, e.g., the Ku-
wait Convention and Protocol, is subject to important qualifications. First, these 
treaties, like all international agreements, are subject to the Charter and its princi-
ples, e.g., the right of self-defense. 24 Second, regional agreements cannot be incon-
sistent with general LOS Convention standards.25 Third, like general LOS 
principles affecting navigation, etc., they are subject, through the LOS Conven-
tions' restatement of the other rules principle, to the LOAC in certain situations.26 
Fourth, any treaty-based norms must be balanced against other sources, e.g., cus-
tom.27 Fifth, any attempt to declare the right to a clean, healthful environment as a 
human right is subject to the human rights conventions' derogation clauses and to 
general law of treaties provisions dealing with LOAC situations,e.g., impossibility 
of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, and the impact of armed 
conflict on treaty obligations.28 
Although there is little positive law governing environmental protection dur-
ingwar, many LOAC norms offer incidental but important protection to the envi-
ronment if observed. These include rules, many of which are also customary 
norms, stated in, e.g., the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Hague Air Rules, the 
Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, cultural property treaties like 
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD, Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and the Conventional Weapons Convention and its proto-
cols. Although these treaties are often site, object or warfare method specific, many 
(e.g., Hague IX, Protocol I, Conventional Weapons Convention) restate customary 
rules applying to all warfare, e.g., military objective, necessity, proportionality and 
limiting actors' liability to what they knew or should have known when they di-
rected an attack. There seems to be no need for international agreements to govern 
environmental protections during naval warfare. 
Modem military manuals analyzing the place of the LOS and environmental 
considerations during war at sea say due regard should be paid to neutrals' LOS 
rights and obligations and to the environment without specifying whether there 
should be one or two due regard applications, i.e., one governing LOS obligations 
and another for the environment, or a single due regard analysis taking into ac-
count LOS and environmental policies and law. In some cases there is no clear 
statement of the place of positive rules oflaw, e.g., in treaties governing the LOAC, 
in connection with environmental protection. As Robertson persuasively argues, 
the first step is to apply positive rules; if there are none, a due regard principle 
should govern for environmental considerations. Chapter VI advocates a single due 
regard principle, taking into account LOS issues and environmental principles. A 
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single due regard principle, not necessarily the same one as in LOAC situations, 
should also apply in self-defense situations where LOS and/or environmental con-
siderations are at issue. Chapter VI also offers a factorial analysis for defining due 
regard. 
Part E. Projections for the Future 
With the USSR's demise and the breakup of other countries, e.g., Czechoslova-
kia and Yugoslavia incident to the end of the Cold War, many trends portend for 
the future of armed conflict situations at sea and the law governing them. As Chap-
ters II-VI demonstrate and McDougal and his associates have theorized, the law 
governing these situations is interactive with many factors, including values at 
stake; participants with different and perhaps mUltiple perceptions that range 
from the individual to the intergovernmental organization; situations that in-
clude time, geography, the degree of organization, and relative crisis level; what as-
sets can be brought to bear on a situation; coercive or persuasive strategies that 
include military force, diplomacy, ideology, or financial strength; short -range out-
comes and long-range effects to be achieved, after which goals should be clarified, 
past trends described, conditions affecting those trends evaluated, future trends 
predicted, and policy alternatives at that point reviewed.29 This multifactor analy-
sis should be no stranger to national or international planners or defense analysts, 
who have used variants for years.30 Part E.l discusses some geopolitical and other 
trends emerging during the Tanker War; PartE.2 follows with trends in the law re-
lated to them. 
1. Geopolitical and Other Trends Emerging During the Tanker War. 
The separatist disintegration of the USSR into Russia and the USSR's compo-
nent republics, and a possibility of further spinoffs from Russia, today a federation 
of semiautonomous areas, and dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-
kia, have been echoed in other countries. These include, e.g., Canada (the Quebec 
separatist movement, establishment of a separate Inuit province), China (Tibet), 
India and Pakistan (the festering Kashmir dispute), Indonesia (East Timor and 
other parts of that archipelago), Iraq and Turkey (Kurds), Italy (tensions between 
northern and southern Italian cultures), Mexico (native Americans in southern 
Mexico), Spain (Basque areas), the United Kingdom (separate legislatures in Scot-
land and Wales) and all across Africa, where colonial boundaries often divide terri-
tories in which native populations of sometimes very different ethnic origins live 
on different sides oflines.31 If the end of the Cold War ended fears of Soviet domi-
nance and a perceived need for association with the United States while remaining 
a cohesive State or nonalignment but with a cohesive facade for possible unified 
opposition to the USSRin the case of Yugoslavia and maybe other countries, and if 
Soviet dominance, now removed, has been a catalyst for expressing pent -up desires 
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for separation (the case of the USSR itself, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the re-
sult in some areas has been clustering around other ideologies, e.g., tribalism,32 
messianic and sometimes fanatic or fundamental religion (a factor in the 1980-88 
Iran-Iraq war33), or political separatism, which continues to bedevil Russia today, 
even after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, Europe, including countries beset with internal separatist 
movements (e.g., Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) has been moving through the 
European Union toward greater economic and political integration that may pre-
vent international wars that have ravaged it during the Twentieth Century.34 In 
the Western Hemisphere the United States, emerging in political, economic and 
military strength as the only superpower, has joined its neighbors in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, a northern hemisphere free trade zone with a 
promise of developing even stronger economies for its members and a potential for 
expansion to Central and South America. The Arab League remains a potential 
force for cohesive action, as does the GCC,35 formed during the Tanker War. 
Today the United Nations has over 180 Members, virtually all countries on 
Earth except Switzerland. If it is too early today to determine whether the United 
Nations, acting through Security Council decisions36 to maintain international 
peace and security, the Cold War era (1947-91), with the risk ofaPermanentCoun-
cil Member veto,37 was certainly no measure of the UN's potential. However, 
Council resolutions promoting freedom of navigation were a positive indicator of 
the UN's potential for the future.38 
The result of these developments may lie in an even more pluralistic world soci-
ety, in which even the smallest and relatively weakest countries may choose to go 
their own way rather than being coerced or guided by the more powerful. Add to 
that the possibility of ethnic or religious fanaticism, and the possibility of national 
decisions not guided by political, economic or legal considerations emerges. And 
although certain areas of the Earth are relatively stable and prosperous due to eco-
nomic integration (the EU, NAFT A), or are relatively prosperous, e.g., the United 
States, budget expenditures for defense, and therefore naval forces, are down 
worldwide. 
With the Soviet threat gone, a rationale for maintaining large and expensive 
armed forces is not as strong for many countries, including the United States. This 
comes when the potential for use of armed forces is more mUltipolar than at any 
time since 1945. Many similar situations involving use of forces occurred during 
the Cold War as before it,39 but the principal thrust of national policies has 
changed dramatically since 1991.40 One indicator of this has been the US Navy's 
"From the Sea" emphasis on littoral warfare as distinguished from a blue water 
high seas confrontation with the Soviet Union.41 One result is that navies may be 
called upon to do more with less. The newer and economically weaker States may 
decide to employ cheaper weapons, as distinguished from the relatively 
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sophisticated (and expensive) weaponry that nations like the United States have. 
The United States and other major naval powers will be called on to counter these 
threats as well as more sophisticated weaponry, including adversaries' use of the 
Internet.42 
The beginnings of this were apparent during the Tanker War. 
Although the mechanisms for formal collective enforcement of the peace were 
available from 1980 through 1988, ending the war was as much a result of the 
belligerents' mutual exhaustion as any outside pressure. The European Economic 
Community, now the EU, and the Group of Seven passed resolutions, but these 
were of no effect; there was no legal authority behind them. The GCC was politi-
cally and militarily weak, sometimes divided on which side to support during the 
war. The Arab League was similarly divided, at least until the end of the war. Al-
though NATO and WEU countries cooperated with each other and other nations, 
including GCC countries, Gulf naval operations were geographically "out of area" 
for both organizations. In the main the result was individual State action, or infor-
mal cooperation, for or against belligerents, with some countries (e.g., the United 
States, the USSR) seemingly tilting either way, depending on circumstances. The 
United Nations, with its potential for Security Council action that might have 
ended the war sooner, did little until 1987, when Resolution 598, passed under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon the belligerents to end the war but did not 
decide43 on action. Given the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of 
flareups around the world where established alliances, e.g., NATO or the Rio Pact, 
do not apply, might this be the trend for future crises? 
Iranian Islamic fundamentalism was a factor in starting the war in 1980; it may 
well have been a factor in prolonging it until that country was totally exhausted in 
terms ofits economy, national morale and military forces. Planning for suicidal at-
tacks on Gulf shipping apparently was part ofIran's strategy late in the war, and 
this factor was echoed in at least neutral responses. The amended US SDZ an-
nouncements for a cordon sanitaire around US forces was one manifestation, and 
clearly the reason for the Airbus tragedy lay in US fears of a kamikazi-style aerial 
crash on a US warship analogous to the Beiruit truck bombing of the Marine bar-
racks in Lebanon. The media carry almost daily accounts of ethnic or reli-
gious-based violence; unquestionably this sort of advocacy may influence national 
decisionmaking involving future naval wars. 
Although the USSR, many European powers and the United States ordered na-
val forces to the Gulf or augmented forces already there, it became apparent that no 
single naval power, not even the United States, had the kind of forces to meet all 
contingencies. US lack of mine countermeasures ships and forces and dependence 
on Western European navies is one example; acceptance of US offers for defense of 
other countries' merchantmen is another. Even at the Cold War's height and as the 
USSR and its navy and merchant marine began declining, there were not enough 
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naval forces available to go around. The same was true for the contemporaneous 
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982), when neither belligerent could bring over-
whelming naval force to bear. This might be compared with the Korean War 
(1950-53) or the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), where there were plenty of naval as-
sets to prosecute policy. 
It is virtually impossible to negotiate a treaty to regulate specific weaponry in an 
age of rapid technological development. At the same time, for those countries with 
less robust economies or defense budgets, there is the option of cheaper, often in-
discriminate weapons, e.g. sea mines whose technology may date back 100 years. 
For countries, e.g., the United States, with economic potential and industrial bases 
for relatively sophisticated and expensive systems, there is the dilemma of having 
to meet sophisticated threats while maintaining the capability for countering 
more traditional but equally deadly weapons. The close-in rapid fire gun as a final 
defense against missile or suicide aircraft attacks on warships is an example of a re-
sponse to a threat as old as World War II's kamikazis, where the proximity fuse and 
the 3-inch rapid-fire gun responded to these attacks. Lack of adequate mine coun-
termeasures forces during the Tanker War is an example of the inability of a rela-
tively sophisticated navy to meet and overcome a traditional, one might say 
archaic, weapon threat. One further problem for the future might be marrying tra-
ditional technology with inexpensive but sophisticated components, e.g., using 
the Internet to trigger traditional devices at great distance and litde cost to a coun-
try, either in manufacturing the device or means of communicating it. Fortunately 
for neutrals involved in the Tanker War, this variant did not occur. 
Another factor that became apparent in the Tanker War was the interest of par-
ties other than States or international organizations. These included arms suppli-
ers, seafarers of many nations, their unions, ship owners and others involved in 
ocean carriage (charterers, sub charterers, cargo interests, marine insurers), that 
might involve still more countries' interests in a conflict. This was really a repeti-
tion of behind the scenes situations in earlier conflicts. For example, the US World 
War II Lend-Lease program of supplying arms began before Pearl Harbor. The 
pattern of parties involved in oceanic cargo transport is nearly the same as it has 
been for years, the major changes being the advent oflarger and more automated 
merchantmen, smaller crews, and a greater use of open registry (flag of conve-
nience) shipping. This trend will continue in the future and may become even 
more complicated with the growth oflarge transnational companies. 
2. Developments in the Law: Trends jor the Future. 
Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, particularly unit and individual 
countries' claims for a right of anticipatory self-defense, is more likely in the plu-
ralistic world of the next millenium. This is so for several reasons. First, the multi-
lateral and bilateral self-defense alliances developed during the Cold War had a 
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goal of containing the potential opponentes), i.e., the USSR and the Soviet bloc by 
NATO, ANZUS, and bilateral treaties like those between Japan and the United 
States and Korea and the United States, or their complimentary opposites, the 
Warsaw Pact and a web ofbilaterals between the USSR and its satellites, the latter 
now all defunct. Second, navies the world over are downsizing, in part due to the 
Cold War's end and in part because of the spiraling cost of modern naval vessels. 
The era oflarge fleet exercises as contemplated during the Cold War44 may be over. 
Naval vessels that remain to patrol the world oceans, and merchant ships as well 
for that matter, remain expensive assets. They are also quite vulnerable to attacks, 
particularly by missiles that kill with the first strike. This new technology suggests 
that countries are more likely to act preemptively, at displays of hostile intent 
rather than hostile acts, to protect these scarce and increasingly valuable naval as-
sets. An increased concern for human life, including the lives of military personnel 
threatened by these kinds of attacks, is also a major factor. As long as principles of 
proportionality, necessity and the availability of no other alternative are observed, 
based on information known or what should have been known at the time, coun-
tries may successfully invoke anticipatory self-defense to justify responses in these 
situations. 
As long as new permanent Security Council Member veto issues do not arise, in-
creased Council lawmaking through its decisions may be the order of the day in 
future conflicts, perhaps started with assertions of the right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense. Whether this will be true is less than clear. An active General As-
sembly, where there is no veto but also no authority to enact positive rules oflaw in 
these situations, may contribute to lawmaking through supporting resolutions as-
serting principles of law. The same may be true in other international organiza-
tions, e.g., IMO, a UN specialized agency, and the ICRC, a nongovernmental 
organization. 
Law of the sea issues will continue to arise. A major contributing factor to this 
may be US failure to ratify the 1982 LOS Convention. Although the Convention's 
navigational articles largely restate customary norms today, as the United States 
delared nearly 20 years ago, custom can change through practice accepted as law. 
However, if the LOS Convention becomes a worldwide treaty-based norm as the 
1949 Geneva Conventions have for humanitarian law during war, the number of 
sources for applying the Convention's terms as law has doubled.46 And while rati-
fication is not an absolute assurance that the law will not change, since a contrary 
custom can develop to outweigh treaty-based norms, the risk of change through 
evolving custom may be halved, particularly since many nations stress the impor-
tance of treaties. For issues related to potential naval warfare situations, e.g., war-
ship innocent passage and straits passage, the difference could be critical. This is 
particularly true where there is an interface between LOAC standards and LOS 
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principles that are relatively hazy because of the nature of custom in a world of over 
180 countries, most of them with seafaring capability. 
If future wars at sea involve ever more sophisticated naval assets opposing so-
phisticated military assets, the result necessarily will be resort to traditional gen-
eral LOAC principles, e.g., target discrimination, military objective, necessity and 
proportionality. For these kinds of conflicts, present treaty law or other attempts 
to specify particular weapons use under particular circumstances will almost al-
ways be outrun by human inventiveness. The same can be said about wars involv-
ing less sophisticated weapons, whether opposed by technologically advanced 
systems or more traditional devices. Some warfare methods, particularly those 
that are by nature indiscriminate, e.g., poison gas or bacteriological weapons, are, 
will be, and should be, outlawed. Beyond this, however, the law of naval warfare 
will remain as it has been for centuries, largely a corpus of custom and general 
principles. 
The maritime environment will continue to be an important factor in naval 
warfare considerations. Although there was one reported environmental catastro-
phe during the Tanker War, the 1983 Nowruz spill, it was the 1990-91 war that re-
sulted in massive destruction of the environment at sea, in the air and on the land. 
Given greater public awareness through the media and today the Internet, the en-
vironment may become a major force in national and international decision-
making. Here too widespread ratification of the LOS Convention will help; its 
comprehensive terms for protection should promote due regard for the maritime 
environment, in connection with due regard for neutrals' LOS Convention rights, 
by belligerents. Moreover, many LOAC treaties, most of which restate customary 
norms, offer protection for the environment if States observe these standards. 
3. Final Thoughts. 
Future conflicts at sea, like the Tanker War and in reality all wars, are likely to 
be multidimensional in terms of participants, levels of participants, organization 
of participants, interests of participants (economic or otherwise), relative sophisti-
::ation of participants (e.g., in weapons available to them), perspectives of partici-
;>ants (perhaps based on ethnic or religious persuasions instead of nationalism or 
.deologies like communism), and factors participants must consider (e.g., Charter 
aw, neutrality or shades of it, the general LOS, LOAC principles, the maritime en-
,ironment). Despite a growing number of international organizations and new 
:ountries which may attempt to harness the worst or best intentions of humanity, 
he beginning of the next millenium may be more pluralistic, more integrated and 
t the same time more disintegrated than at any recent time before. 
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1. For further analysis of the issues, see generally Chapter III. 
2. See n. III.lO and accompanying text. 
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4. Pact of Paris, n. III.160. 
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8. For a recent analysis, advocating US ratification of the LOS Convention as part of a comprehensive 
international oceans policy,see generallY GEORGE V. GALDORSI & KEVIN R VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW 
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13. For further analysis, see Part V.C.5. 
14. For further analysis, see Part V.D.4. 
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